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I. Introduction: Preserving Batsonand the Peremptory Challenge
Despite the peremptory challenge’s venerable common-law3
antecedents, there has lately been a movement in the criminal justice
system to abolish this ancient workhorse. Jurists,4 practitioners and
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legal scholars5 have begun to clamor for the outright prohibition of this
jury selection tool, a movement that essentially began with the
introduction of the Batson procedure a little over twenty years ago.6
Batson’scritics argue that the doctrine is in a state of disarray, and for
many, their solution is to simply dispense with the entire exercise.
The reasons for eliminating the peremptory challenge are varied.
The combination of the Batson procedure and the peremptory
challenge have been accused of causing multiple problems, including
confusing standards; injecting bias into the proceedings; permitting
defense counsel’s unclean hands; inculcation of bias and unconscious
racism into jury selection; waste of judicial time and money; and the
negative public perception of jury selection.
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What the Batson critics overlook, however, is the positive power of
the Batson doctrine. Using legal ethics as a lens through which to
interpret Batson sheds new light on the doctrine. Properly understood,
the Batson procedure enforces a normative framework of legal ethics,
providing an aspirational standard for the legal profession. By
fostering a non-discrimination norm as part of the norm of
professionalization, Batson both improves the actions of lawyer and
judges during jury selection while at the same time constructing and
compelling an aspirational code of ethics. Batson’s ethical imperative
affects the norms of the legal profession itself.
Batson has a largely unarticulated ethical component, one that
invokes a lawyer’s professional responsibility. By and through the
Batson procedure, prosecutors, defense counsel and judges are
compelled to act ethically in shaping the criminal jury. For trial
counsel, this means trying to eliminate overtly illegal considerations of
race and gender from jury selections and pointing out their opponents’
unconstitutional choices, as well as being ethical and honest when
defending against a Batson claim. For the bench, this means
scrutinizing peremptory challenges carefully, occasionally bringing a
sua sponte Batson challenge of their own, as well as applying
considered and reasoned analysis in the three-step Batson process.
Batson’s ethical component not only complicates our understanding of
the professional behavior of the criminal bar, but also provides an
aspirational standard for criminal lawyers and judges.
The Batson procedure also gives us a concrete example of how the
norms of the legal profession itself can be affected by laws.
Traditionally, we think of laws being shaped by norms.7 With Batson,
however, the law itself is affecting the legal profession’s nondiscrimination norms. With the constant requirement to abide by the
rules of Batson (that is, no challenges based on race or gender8),
lawyers are compelled to focus on the norm of professionalism during
jury selection, an important social norm. The desire to eliminate the
7
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peremptory challenge and the Batson procedure disregards the power
of the law to affect the social norms of lawyers. Batson doctrine
creates a space where law—here, the Batson procedure—is
expressively influencing lawyers’ ethical behavior by the message it
embodies.
Finally, a legal ethics approach to Batson provides the best means
of understanding why the courts have adopted this specific doctrine to
enforce the two critical rights of criminal jury selection: the right of
the defendant to a bias-free jury and the right of the potential juror to
serve. Instead of requiring that a wrongly excluded juror seek remedy
in an extra-legal proceeding outside of the criminal trial, the Supreme
Court demanded that criminal courts themselves actively participate in
ensuring that jury selection is free from bias. This decision makes
most sense when legal ethics is viewed as a basis for a normative
framework for establishing a means of enforcement for lawyers’
ethical obligations.
Viewing the Batson doctrine through a legal ethics lens also helps
clarify why the Supreme Court chose to enforce the norm of nondiscrimination through the trial court. Given the tradition within legal
ethics of imposing procedures and prophylactic rules to ensure that the
legal profession meets its obligations, the Court decided that the best
way to enforce ethical obligations was to remind lawyers of the
profession’s ethical aspirations. Accordingly, Batson functions as both
a reminder of lawyers’ aspirational goals as well as a means of
enforcement and attorney discipline.
This Article has several aims. First, I will propose a legal ethics
theory of Batson, as the Batson doctrine is a vehicle through which the
legal system achieves a major aspiration of professionally responsible
behavior. Second, I will provide a measured look at the anxiety
surrounding the Batson procedure and the peremptory challenge,
starting with its most recent history, and explain how my theory of
legal ethics can resolve many of the Batson grievances. Finally, I will
examine whyBatson is so important and look at some of the additional
implications of my legal ethics approach.
II. A Legal Ethics Theory of Batson
The ethical deliberations compelled and enforced by Batson are
critical in understanding Batson’s value. Batson has an unarticulated
ethical component, one that invokes a lawyer’s professional
responsibility and fosters a nondiscrimination norm as part of the norm
of professionalism. This is an area mostly unexplored by the
professional responsibility literature,9 and one I will explore in greater
detail.
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One of the few treatments of ethics in Batson can be found in Sheri Lynn Johnson,
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The field of legal ethics provides a useful lens for thinking
about Batson. One aspect of Batson which is unique is that it protects
the right of the potential jurors to serve on the jury, yet it is enforced in
criminal justice proceedings by defense lawyers, prosecutors and
judges. A focus on legal ethics makes this aspect less anomalous,
however, because Batson’s ethical imperative compels responsible
behavior by attorneys and jurists on behalf of not only the defendant,
but also the potential jurors. The result is what one scholar has
propounded as a moral theory of ethical lawyering; the lawyer or judge
engaging with the Batson doctrine—which occurs in each and every
jury selection—takes "personal moral responsibility for the
consequences of their professional acts."10
The system of legal ethics is generally designed to protect the
public and, in doing so, protect the integrity and reputation of the
profession. Traditionally, the standard enforcement mechanism for
legal ethic complaints is the client-initiated attorney disciplinary
proceedings. Other types of enforcement mechanisms, however, often
create a situation where the threat of the disciplinary proceeding is
unlikely to provide a means of policing wrongdoing. For example, we
frequently rely on prosecutors and other lawyers to initiate charges
against attorneys who assist their clients’ criminal activities.11
Traditional enforcement mechanisms, however, frequently fail to
police attorney misconduct, as the punishment is so far attenuated
SYMPOSIUM ON RACE AND CRIMINAL LAW 475 (1998) (articulating a broader vision
of the Batson obligation and providing a concrete ethical standard for assessing
when a strike violates that obligation). Johnson, however, excludes defense counsel
from her vision, and although she has recognized that Batson imposes ethical
obligations on lawyers, she disagrees that legal ethics actually helps explain Batson
doctrine. Robin Charlow’s exploration of the ethicality of Batson focuses primarily
on possible sanctions to be visited on attorneys who make discriminatory strikes.
See Charlow, supra note __, at __.
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DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 17 (2000). See also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER :
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (discussing the ideal of the
lawyer-statesman, which Kronman maintains is dying a slow death in the American
legal profession). Although I agree with Kronman that the lawyer-statesman ideal
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replace it are “anemic.” Id. at 3. On the contrary, I contend that Batson is one
example that illustrates the sense of honor and duty that most attorneys and judges
possess, particularly in the arena of criminal justice, that most maligned of practice
areas. As I discuss below, Batson doctrine, although imperfect, gives lawyers an
aspirational ideal that is achievable in the realities of daily practice. Although not
so weighty a concept as the lawyer-statesman ideal, Batson promotes legal ethics in
one of the most fraught areas of justice, the criminal trial.
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from the actual misdeed that there is little reinforcement of positive
behavior.
The Batson procedure is a special type of enforcement
mechanism, one which differs from the rest by accurately and
immediately policing wrongdoing. Batson should thus be seen as one
way in which the legal system achieves one of its aspirations, because
the ethical behavior of participants in the criminal trial is ensured by
the rules of the doctrine. As one scholar notes, “the likelihood that the
traits of character on which ethical lawyering depends will be fostered
or undermined among individual lawyers will be determined to a great
extent by the shape of the institutional framework of legal practice.”12
The framework of Batson fosters ethical lawyering by its immediate
and vigorous enforcement mechanisms.
By and through the Batson procedure, prosecutors, defense
counsel13 and judges are compelled to act ethically in shaping the
criminal jury.14 For counsel, this means trying to eliminate overtly
illegal considerations of race and gender from their jury selections and
pointing out their opponents’ unconstitutional choices, as well as being
ethical and honest when undergoing a Batson challenge to their
peremptory challenge of a potential juror. For the bench, this means
scrutinizing peremptory challenges carefully, occasionally bringing a
sua sponte Batson challenge of their own, as well as considered and
reasoned analysis in the three-step Batson process.15
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The state action invoked by the Batson procedure brings up the issue of “the
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6

Batson’s ethical component not only complicates our
understanding of the professional behavior of criminal lawyers, but
also provides an aspirational standard16 for criminal lawyers and
judges. By asserting that defense counsel have unclean hands, or that
both prosecutors and defense wish to misuse peremptories to
manipulate voir dire, as some of the Batson critics do, is to
underestimate the professional behavior of not only criminal lawyers
and their adversaries, but also the criminal bench. Batson’s role in
uncovering pretext, in the beginning of the criminal jury trial, creates a
level of ethicality which sets the tone for the rest of the judicial
proceeding.
The idea that lawyers play a role as public guardian is
definitely one in retreat.17 Some scholars, however, have suggested
that lawyers’ commitment to the public good is an aspiration worth
reviving.18 This is where Batson may provide a useful example. By
providing an open forum in which all three actors in the criminal
justice system are not only required but also encouraged to watch for
bias and prejudice, their own19 and others’, Batson can play a small
to serve on a jury, and all peremptory challenges are enacted by the state.
Impermissibly striking potential jurors on the basis of race or gender causes two
potential harms to merge: in expressive state action, the mimetic (appearing to do
wrong) and non-mimetic (actually doing wrong) combine, as “appearance and
reality coalesce.” Hellman, Judging Appearances, at __. In Hellman’s phrasing,
how the action of impermissibly striking jurors due to race or gender appears
(biased) and how it actually is (biased) are the same.
16

By promoting this aspiration standard, I do not mean to contradict Fred
Zacharias’s keen observation about “the fiction that lawyers somehow are, or can be
regulated into being, more upstanding than laypersons.” Fred Zacharias, The
Humanization of Lawyers, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 5
(2003). Instead, I look to a more realistic aspirational standard, one that promotes
not so much a “higher standard of citizenship” as a standard of basic ethical
behavior that I would hope all people would strive for, not just lawyers.
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See Russell Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 417-19 (2001).
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See Russell Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, Am. Law, July 2001, at 79. Pearce
observes, however, that efforts at promoting this kind of commitment have failed so
far, because law is still a business. Id. For a view of how aspirational legal ethics
can function in the business law world, see Howard M. Erichson, Doing Well by
Doing Good, 57 VAND. L. REV __ (2004).
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Of course, one specific concern defense counsel has which the prosecutor and the
judge do not is the question of client loyalty. As Erichson observes, while the
theme of commitment to the public good pervades discussions of lawyer
professionalism, views differ substantially on the extent to which lawyers should
focus on the public good versus loyal and zealous representation of their clients.
See Erichson, supra note __, at 23 n.117. For example, compare Monroe
Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1990) (arguing for an advocacy
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role in reviving the conception of lawyers as public guardians.20 By
judicious use of Batson, the original sense of “pro bono publico”—the
broad concept of what was within the public interest—could be
restored as well, instead of limiting it to the definition it currently has
of undercompensated legal representation.21 In the spirit of Roscoe
Pound, Batson could link professional conduct with serving the public
interest—“it is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public interest.”22 As well, careful and proper use of Batson
could provide the moral accountability that professional responsibility
scholars desire to instill into the profession at large.23
Batson, too, relies on a shared trust between the prosecutor,
defense counsel and judge. Although each and any one of these
players may start the Batson ritual by raising the challenge, in the end
the others can only rely on the challenged attorney’s word whether he
has a genuine race-neutral reason for striking the potential juror. Once
the Batson challenge has been raised, if the race-neutral reasoning is
found suspect, then the other two actors in the criminal trial are bound
to be more suspicious of the challenged attorney, since the trust has
been broken. Maintaining this level of trust provides another way in
perspective); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer- Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (same) with David Luban,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (arguing for a perspective of
moral activism); William Simon, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998) (arguing for a
competing vision focusing on legal merit and justice as opposed to subjective
morality).
20

One area in which it can be argued that the role of the lawyer as public guardian
still remains is in “cause lawyering.” Menkel-Meadows defines cause lawyering as
“an activity that seeks to use law-related means or seeks to change laws or
regulations to achieve greater social justice,” for both particular individuals and
disadvantaged groups. See Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering:
Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice
Lawyers, in Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 38 (1998). Many, if not all,
criminal defense attorneys, particularly those who represent the indigent, see their
role as counsel as a means of cause lawyering.
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See Erichson, supra note __, at 18. As Erichson points out, “the profession’s
modern usage of the phrase ‘pro bono publico’ includes representation without fee
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supra note __, at 18 n.87.
Erichson argues, correctly in my view, that the
“prevailing conception of public interest work is based on considered to be public
interest work is based on an implicit determination of market undervaluation,” but
this does not have to be the case. See id. See also Judith L. Maute, Changing
Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse
Oblige to State Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 113 (2002).
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which Batson positively influences legal ethics. Moreover, it helps
illustrate how the norms of professional responsibility are affected by
legal sources.
But Batson’s ethical component is even broader. As one legal
ethics scholar has observed:
How lawyers reconcile the tension between moral
aspirations and pragmatic constraints is important not
just for the profession but also for the nation. Lawyers
play a crucial role in the structure of our private affairs
and public institutions. . . . A central challenge of legal
practice is how to live a life of integrity in the tension
between these competing demands.24
Batson’s requirement that lawyers and judges behave ethically has
spillover effects onto the larger world of criminal justice.25 The
criminal defendant, knowing her lawyer cannot illegally strike
potential jurors based on race, ethnicity or gender, is touched by the
egalitarian principles embedded in the procedure. The prosecutor
representing the state or the nation knows his actions, if illegal or
underhanded, will reflect negatively on the polity. The judge has her
own responsibility to independently scrutinize each side’s peremptory
challenges and isolate any that even smack of improper reasoning.
The Batson ritual, enacted over and over again in the criminal
courtroom, promotes ethical behavior not just in the selection of the
criminal jury but also the larger world because the integrity and
fairness practiced there promotes social justice.26 Social justice begets
more social justice.
Additionally, Batson provides a respite from the common
problems of adversarial justice. The “corruption of judgment”27 that
24

Deborah Rhode, Introduction, ETHICS IN PRACTICE __ (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
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The Batson procedure also provides a corrective for some of the critique of
professional responsibility as it is currently taught to lawyers and law students--the
legalistic model. As Baron and Greenstein note, “law students learn to think of law
generally, and Professional Responsibility specifically, as disengaged from moral
considerations.” Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE
DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY __ (2001). Batson is a
counterpoint to this problem because it is a legal problem directly engaged with the
moral considerations of ethical behavior, racial equality and honest practice.
26

As Rhode argues, “The public deserves reasonable access to legal assistance and
legal processes that satisfy minimum standards of fairness, effectiveness and
integrity. And the profession deserves conditions of practice that reinforce such
standards in the service of social justice.” Rhode, supra note __, at __.
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David Luban, Wrongful Obedience: Bad Judgments and Warranted Excuses,
ETHICS IN PRACTICE _ (OUP 2000).
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often results from the adversarial system28 is less likely to occur in
criminal jury selection due to Batson; because there is a ritualized,
easily invoked correction to the manipulation of voir dire for unethical
or illegal reasons by three separate actors (judge, prosecutor and
defense counsel), professionally responsible behavior is that much
more likely to occur. Batson is a tool of self-regulation29 that works,
because the attempts to strike potential jurors for illegal motives is
more often than not caught and punished. Unlike many areas of the
law, which have little to no disciplinary proceedings except for the
most egregious of cases, justice for the Batson violation is swift,
reliable and fitting the crime.
The “evolving ideal”30 of professional responsibility should
expand to absorb the role of Batson procedure in criminal law.
Although admittedly imperfect, Batson provides both a path and a
floor to the lawyers involved in the arena of criminal justice. Batson’s
built-in self regulation permits each party involved in the criminal
case—defense counsel, defendant, prosecutor and judge—to act as
ethically as possible as well as to examine their own conscience if
called to account for their jury strikes.31 In sum, Batson narrows the
divide between “ethical aspirations and daily practices”32 which should
always be the goal of the ethical lawyer.
Examined closely, the Batson doctrine espouses a theory of
legal ethics that urges counsel to behave in a professionally

28

As Robert Gordon has documented, the legal system is a common good that
cannot function effectively in the face of unrestrained partnership. See Robert
Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Oxford U.
P. 2000)
29

Of course, as Zacharias, among others, has observed, “professional regulation
has followed a trend of becoming ‘legalized’—more specific and designed for
enforcement.” Zacharias, Humanization, supra note __, at 15. See also Frank O.
Bowman, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The Misuse of ‘Ethical Rules’ Against
Prosecutors To Control The Law of The State, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 762
(1996) (describing “an increasing ‘legalization’ of attorney discipline”); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1241 (1991)
(nothing that traditional professional “norms have become ‘legalized’”).
30
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Unlike many other ethics rules, Batson’s enforcement mechanisms ensure prompt
following of its ethical dictates. Cf. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by
Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70
Fordham L. Rev. 1599 (2002) (arguing that rules of ethics are so minimal and
ambiguous that they do not promote justice, concluding that legislatures and courts
should create standards that clearly define prohibited conduct, including
punishments of civil liability and sanctions).
32

Rhode, supra note __, at __.
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responsible way and elucidates ethical means of behavior for both
attorneys and judges. The text of Batson itself indicates that the
Supreme Court has seen Batson as representing an ethical imperative,
emphasizing the unique role and responsibility of lawyers.
A. The Ethical Imperative of Batson v. Kentucky
A close reading of Batson v. Kentucky illustrates the ethical
imperative propounded by the Supreme Court in its creation of Batson
doctrine. Batson can be summarized as a three-part process to
examine whether the disputed peremptory challenge was rooted in bias
or discriminatory thinking. Step one requires defense counsel to make
a prima facie case that the challenges in the case at hand were racially
motivated and that the juror is a member of a “cognizable racial
group.”33 In step two, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a
race-neutral reason for the challenges.34 Finally, if a race-neutral
reason is provided, in step three the trial court determines whether the
challenger has met her burden of proving that the potential jurors had
been struck due to racial prejudice.35 The Court has recognized that
each state remained free to develop its own practices regarding the
manner in which its trial courts should handle Batson claims.36
The Batson opinion begins by reaffirming that a state’s
purposeful or deliberate denial of participation to blacks as jurors in
the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause,37
thus reminding all readers that the ethical practice of lawyering was at
stake. Expounding on this principle, the Court goes on to specify that
a defendant has a right to be tried by a jury whose members are
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,38 explicitly noting that
the “Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State
will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account
33

Batson, id. at 82. The challenger must show that (1) the group is definable and
limited by some clearly identifiable factor; (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas
or experiences runs through the group; and (2) a community of interest exists
among the group’s members, such that the group’s interest cannot be adequately
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. See United
States v. Svrgo, 815 F.2d 30,33 (1st Cir. 1987).
34

See Batson at 97. Although the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the
same level of justification as a for-cause challenge, it cannot be pretextual. See id.

35

See id.

36

See id. at 99.

37

Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.

38

Batson, id. at 85-86.
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of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group
are no qualified to serve as jurors.”39 Such strong language at the
beginning of the opinion serves to set up the prosecutor’s ethical
requirement to act honorably and honestly in her use of peremptory
challenges to create a fair jury.
The Court goes on to explain how the harm from
discriminatory jury selection extends from harm to the defendant to the
excluded juror and, ultimately, to the entire community.40 By
expanding the realm of injury caused by biased peremptory challenges,
the Court makes clear that the duty of the prosecutor, to behave
ethically in jury selection, is essential not only to ensure a fair trial for
one person, but also to sustain the underlying ethos of responsible
legal behavior. To fail to do so is to injure three separate parties: the
defendant, the excluded juror, and, most importantly for our purposes,
the community at large. The Court thus provides a basis for why the
non-discrimination norm fostered by Batson helps create a pervading
sense of ethical behavior for everyone involved.
The Batson Court also discusses why it chose to have the
requirement for ethical behavior in criminal jury selection enforced by
judges. By stating that the “Constitution requires . . . we look beyond
the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and also consider
challenged selection practices to afford ‘protection against action of
the State through its administrative officers in effecting the prohibited
discrimination,’”41 the Court directly addresses why judges are the
most effective way to enforce Batson’s ethical requirements.
Because judges, in accepting counsel’s peremptory challenges,
implement any bias through the hands of the State, it only makes sense
to have this very same hand of the State reject impermissible
challenges.
Unlike so many instances of attorney misconduct, Batson
allows the State a direct role in enforcing ethical conduct (through the
role of the judge in evaluating a Batson challenge) and in disciplining
the erring attorney (by refusing her peremptory challenge due to a
finding of bias). Hence the Court’s decision to give trial courts the
disciplinary tools for correcting ethical violations in jury selection
makes sense. As the Batson court argues, “[w]e have confidence that
trial judges, experience in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide
if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black
jurors.”42
39

Batson, id. at 86.

40

Batson, id. at 87.

41

Batson, id. at 88.

42

Batson, id. at 97.
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In setting out the three-step procedure of Batson doctrine, the
Court specifies its ethical requirements for trial courts and prosecutors.
First, in determining if the defendant carried her burden of persuasion,
the trial court must undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”43
That is to say, the trial court must ethically use its knowledge of
motivation to sift through the prosecutor’s intent, to see if the
prosecutor has behaved ethically in the first instance.
Next, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to ethically explain the
exclusion of the potential juror. The Court pointedly remarks, in its
discussion of step two, that the “State cannot meet its burden on mere
general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they
properly performed their official duties.”44
This warning to
prosecutors also functions as a sign of the heightened ethical standards
that the Court has chosen to impose in overruling prior law and
implementing Batson. By stating the requirement that the prosecutor
must give “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his
legitimate reasons”45 so starkly and repeatedly, the Court signals that
the ethical behavior of the prosecutor is paramount to the proper
functioning of the Batson doctrine.
Interestingly, the Court is most explicit in addressing its ethical
requirements for judges and prosecutors in a footnote directed to
Justice Marshall46 at the end of the opinion.47 Noting that it does not
share Marshall’s concerns regarding prosecutorial and judicial
enforcement, the Court rejects the notion that prosecutors will not
fulfill their duty to exercise only legitimate challenges.48 Instead, it
assumes and compels their responsible behavior, along with that of the
bench, by articulating a specific ethical responsibility: “Nor do we
think that this historic trial practice, which long has served the
selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of an
apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform
conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution.”49 By
singling out the conscientious duties of the bar and the bench, the

43

Batson, id. at 93.

44

Batson, id. at 94.

45

Batson, id. at 98 (quotations and citations omitted).

46

I discuss Justice Marshall’s Batson concurrence supra Part II.

47

Batson, id. at 99 n.22.

48

Batson, id. at 99 n.22.

49

Batson, id. at 99 n.22.
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Court made clear the unique role and responsibility of lawyers to
behave appropriately in criminal jury selection.
Ultimately, by so explicitly articulating the behavioral
standards for both the judge and the prosecutor, the Batson Court lays
down both an ethical imperative and an aspirational goal for the
profession. As the Court states in its conclusion, “[i]n view of the
heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we
ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his
race.”50
The Court makes clear that the Batson apparatus is designed to
protect the defendant, the potential juror and the public, the same
constituency with which legal ethics is deeply concerned. The ethical
imperative expressed by the Batson Court is one way the law achieves
one of its aspirations, reinforcing the public trust that is inherent in the
model of legal ethics.

B. Batson’spositive effect on the norms of the legal profession
Unlike neoclassical law and economics, legal ethics is based on
the view that the legal profession has norms and that lawyers will
generally seek to comply with these norms. Legal ethics does not
naively avoid enforcing the obligations that it imposes, but rather than
seeking some type of optimal penalty structure, it works by reminding
lawyers of the profession’s ethical aspirations, and, in extreme cases,
disciplining lawyers who have flouted the rules. In short, legal ethics
provides an alternative framework to neoclassical law and economics
in providing a means of enforcing obligations.
Batson influences behavior expressively through the message it
embodies, positively influencing the norms of the legal profession.
Admittedly, fostering good social norms among the population at large
cannot be a sufficient justification for Batson. Batson is too low
salience of an issue to have very much of an effect of social norm writ
large, because the actual procedure is not utilized that frequently
within criminal trials.51 Batson’s power to foster a non-discrimination
norm as part of the norms of professionalism, however, provides a
sound justification. The movement to eliminate the peremptory

50

Batson, id. at 99 (emphasis mine).

51

Anecdotally, I have been told that many criminal practitioners refer to Batson as
“the A-bomb” and are hesitant to invoke it, in part because opposing counsel view it
as an accusation of racism.

14

challenge and the Batson procedure disregards its power to affect the
norms52 of the legal profession.
Batson gives us a fascinating, concrete example of how ethical
norms can be affected by laws. Traditionally, we think of norms
shaping laws,53 as legal regulation often functions to particularize the
broader behavioral standards embodied in social norms.54 Norms
impact the actual rules of operation in society in at least two distinct
ways.55
First, people’s conduct and behavior are influenced by
established norms in a society.56 Second, “norms can motivate law
and have a substantial influence on what gets codified as law.”57
52

As Lynn Stout observes, there is some disagreement among legal scholars who
write upon the topic of social norms as to an exact definition of what social norms
are. However, “there seems to be a general consensus . . . that norms are rules of
behavior that are enforced primarily not by courts, but by other forces.” Lynn A.
Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms, Georgetown Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 265902 (March 2001) (arguing that the human
tendency to act in an other-regarding fashion (to sacrifice in order to help or harm
others) is far more pervasive, powerful, and important than generally recognized).
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See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Normative Evaluations and Legal Analogues, keynote
lecture at conference on Norms and the Law, Wash. U. School of Law, March 2001)
(transcript on file with author) (“norms and laws are intimately connected and
influence each other. The influences work in both directions.”) See generally
Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, eds., March
2001); (reviewing literature); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Social Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-46 (1997) (same);
Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996);
Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2002);
Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998). See also ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000) (discussing laws, norms and economic methodology).
54

See McAdams, supra note __, at 340-50.

55

See Sen, supra note __, at 1.

56

See Sen, supra note __, at 1. Sen goes on to explain:
Norms can impose obligations and constraints which work
like law, and this is perhaps the most direct manifestation of
norms as “unwritten law” to which Charles Davenant referred.
At the very least, norms can supplement legal rules (the
“written law,” as it were) that are in force. . . . Norms and their
operation cannot altogether supplant legal rules and their
enforcement, but they can certainly supplement the latter
effectively, which is the point at issue here.

See id.
57

Sen, supra note __, at 1. Sen points out that this can either work directly through
legislation or more indirectly through judicial interpretation. See id.
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Frameworks of law and legal thinking have also influenced the
discussion and formulation of norms, however.58 The laws embodied
in Batson and progeny themselves affects norms.59 The influence goes
both ways—not only do norms influence laws, but law and legal
thinking also shape norms and normative thinking. Specifically, law
and legal thinking have a great influence on ethical norms, as legal
concepts “can thus help to clarify what is to be morally sought as well
as to communicate the results of ethical deliberations.” 60
Batson is such an example. From the time of the Civil Rights
movement and the codifications of those rights into the Civil Rights
Act, society slowly had begun to move towards a more expansive
theory of rights for minorities and women. There was a significant lag
in the actualization of such rights, however. This was true in both
general society and in the criminal justice system. By the mid-1980’s,
the laws that had created the expanding norms of equality in everyday
life had not, for various reasons,61 reached the criminal courtroom.
Thus, the creation of the Batson procedure62 in 1986 responded to
these ethical deliberations, and the doctrine has grown as our
understanding of what is to be “morally sought” has expanded
accordingly.
Approximately 20 years later, the legal concept crystallized by
Batson—that blacks, and later women and other minorities, cannot be
stricken from the jury due to their immutable characteristics—has
helped clarify what is to be “morally sought:”63 the fair selection of a

58

See Sen, supra note __, at 2. As Sen notes, since these connections from law to
norms have received less attention than the connections of norms to law, they need
“more explicit examination.” Id.
59

See Sen, supra note ___, at 3 (discussing “the way frameworks of law and legal
thinking influence the discussion and formulation of norms.”)

60

Sen,supra note __, at 4.
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Such as Jim Crow laws, the slowness of society to change, etc.
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The fact that these racial and gender norms have evolved so rapidly in the past
thirty years, in part via their inculcation in the law, can be attributed to their status
as other-regarding norms. As Stout argues, “other-regarding behaviors are
especially likely to be socially ‘codified’ into norms, and especially likely to prove
sticky, because human beings are predisposed to adopt other-regarding preference
functions.” Stout, supra note __, at __. Requiring egalitarian treatment for blacks,
women and ethnic minorities encapsulate the more general norm of “treating others
as you would like to be treated.” The fact these Batson norms have arisen also
argue for their efficiency. As Ellickson has documented, norms tend to support
efficient behaviors because people have an innate preference for utilitarian, or
welfare-improving, norms. See Ellickson, supra note __, at 29; Stout, supra note
__, at __.
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criminal jury, untainted by bias, heuristics, or contemporary anxieties
over race and gender. The difficulty of this goal was indeed made
easier by establishing its “legal analogue.” In short, without Batson, it
is reasonable to assume that biased juries might still have been
empanelled for at least another decade, if not, with more subtlety,
through today.64
Moreover, a legal enactment like Batson can also help
publicize a new consensus about desirable behavior.65 Although by
1986 there was, in the broadest sense, a general consensus that
discrimination on the basis of race was unconstitutional and improper,
the holding of this theoretical norm had not quite percolated down to
the specific reality of criminal jury selection. Similarly, in 1992,
although the gender norm of egalitarian, non-discriminatory treatment
had begun to take hold in general society, it had not permeated the
strongholds of the criminal courtroom. The principles of Batson as a
legal norm have helped confirm, inculcate and publicize the
requirements of the most modern racial and gender norms for lawyers.
This process continues today. The discussion, in the courts and
in the legal academy, about the permissibility of challenging jurors on
basis of national origin and religion illustrates the questionable status
both of these classifications have achieved in the national discourse.
The lack of a legal norm crystallizing these classifications as either
permissible or impermissible not only shows the confusion and lack of
clarity that these labels currently evoke in society, it also demonstrates
the need for law to help create the social norms themselves. Batson
and progeny are a fine example of the two-way street of influence
from legal norms to social norms and back again.
Recent law and economic work also appreciates the
significance of norms, as the economics literature now uses norms to
explain an incredible variety of positive and normative issues.66 As
63

In this sense, I am endorsing a “naturalist” theory of the law, as opposed to either
a positivist or historicist theory. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Historical
Foundations of Law, Emory University School of Law Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, No. 05-3, at 3 (defining naturalist theory of law as
one focused on law as a moral instrument, in contrast to positivist or historicist
theories).
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For a view arguing that criminal law in general should track social norms to be
effective, see PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Westview 1995) (suggesting that
there is a tension between the legal code in America and folk intuitions concerning
criminal culpability and the proportionality of punishment).
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Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 350-51 (1997).
66

See McAdams, Regulation of Norms, supra note __, at 340. For a representative
discussion of norms in the field of law and economics, see, for example, Robert
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEG. STUDIES 585 (1998); ROBERT
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one scholar notes, “many legal rules are best understood as efforts to
harness the independent regulatory power of social norms.”67
When, as here, law influences an equilibrium, there are both
behavioral and hermeneutic effects.68 Behaviorally, the Batson
doctrine has encouraged lawyers to act in an ethical manner during
jury selection, and decreased their use of bias, consciously and
subconsciously, in using peremptory challenge. Hermeneutically,
Batson has helped change beliefs that lawyers possess by imposing
such immediate and shaming consequences to improper and
unconstitutional peremptory challenges. Accordingly, law influences
behavior by changing the norms that determine the meaning ascribed
to behavior.69
Moreover, Batson has influenced and reinforced ethical norms
through its expressive function.70 According to the expressive theory
of law, “the expression of social values is an important function of the
courts, or possibly the most important function of the courts.”71 Norms
can explain the expressive function of law: by "making a statement,"
law can strengthen the norms it embodies and weaken those it
condemns.72 Batson doctrine provides an instrument for changing
social norms by extrinsically expressing commitments to ethical
behavior and non-discriminatory actions.73
Finally, Batson both compels and helps communicate ethical
deliberations over what it means to empanel a “proper” criminal jury.
“Law can speak loud and clear, and moral reasoning may have use for
that legal voice.”74 Here, the moral reasoning that required equal
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Richard H. McAdams, Signaling
Discount Rates: Law, Norms, And Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625
(2001); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 1-7 (2000). As McAdam notes,
“More recently, the subject of social norms has come to the sustained attention of
rational choice scholars, including economists, philosophers, political scientists, and
legal theorists.” McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, at 625-26.
67

Posner, supra note __, at 7.

68

Posner, supra note __, at 33.

69

See Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
968-72, 1019-25 (1995).
70

For a general exploration how law influences norms through its expressive
function, see Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, at 585-6 (equating creation of
norms by court to expression of social values);

71

Cooter, supra note __, at 585.

72

See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2034-35 (1996).

73

See Cooter, supra note __, at 611.
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rights for all citizens was articulated by Batson and its progeny, and
the criminal justice system quite obviously needed its legal and moral
directive.75 Batson’s requirement to protect the criminal defendant,
the prospective juror and the public’s participation in the jury and
foster anti-discriminatory actions helps preserve the moral rights so
necessary for a proper functioning of legal ethics.

C. Enforcing Batson Norms through Jury Selection
Batson norms are primarily enforced through jury selection. One
way that Batson differs, in terms of legal ethics, from most other
constitutional rules is how it is enforced in the proceedings of the
actual trial; even when a Batson decision is overturned on the appellate
level, the remedy is invariably sent back to the trial court for
scrutinization of the challenged strike. That is to say, unlike most
attorney violations of legal ethics, the Batson doctrine requires the
process of jury selection to be the locus for the enforcement of the
Batson norm instead of attorney disciplinary proceedings.
Though the Constitution provides the source of the right to have a
jury free from discrimination and bias, legal ethics provides the best
means of understanding the approach to enforcing the right that the
courts have adopted. As most recently elucidated by Mitchell Berman,
there is an important distinction between constitutional meaning and
the means by which that meaning is enforced.76 The conflict between
constitutional meaning vs. constitutional doctrine is too great a subject
to discuss here, and I limit my discussion to the specifics of Batson.
When it comes to implementing the constitutional meaning of
Batson, viewing the procedure through the lens of legal ethics gets us
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Sen, supra note __, at 4.
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Sen goes on to point out, however, that “it is not in general cogent even to
presume that if a normative right is important, then it must necessarily be
appropriate to try to legislate and institutionalize it as a legal right.” Sen, supra note
__, at 7. In the case of Batson, one can presume that the impetus of the Civil Rights
and feminist movement spurred the creation of the law and its progeny. I do not
mean to suggest, however, that moral rights will always find their champion in legal
ones; quite the opposite. “In many cases the influence of legal analogy and legal
thinking has been to narrow the breadth and range of ethical and political
reasoning.” Id. at 16.
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See generally Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VIRGINIA LAW
REVIEW 1, 35-50 (2004). As Berman observes, “American constitutional theorists
and judges have struggled with problems of constitutional interpretation, exploring
how meaning is properly derived from the Constitution and, insofar as the answer
may be different, how courts ought to derive such meaning.” Id. at 3.
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closest to properly-crafted constitutional doctrine.77 The constitutional
meaning of Batson—that attorneys must use non-discriminatory bases
to strike jurors peremptorily—is translated almost immediately to a
workable constitutional Batson doctrine through the constant and
regular enforcement mechanisms of the trial court and scrutiny of
opposing counsel.
With Batson, there is little room for slippage between
constitutional meaning and doctrine, because the meaning is enforced
in the very same space that the doctrine is practiced. On a less
theoretical level, this means that the directions given by the Batson
Court and progeny—that the equal protection clause prohibits
discriminatory striking of potential jurors on the basis of race or
gender—are easily translated into understandable doctrine by the court
and counsel because the lapse between violation and cure is minimal.
Legal ethics helps foster the connection between Batson’s
constitutional meaning and doctrine, because legal ethics contains the
tradition of imposing procedures and prophylactic rules to ensure that
the legal profession meets its obligations. The court-made rules that
govern the implementation of Batson in the trial courts make the most
sense when viewed through the legal ethics lens because Batson’s
elaborate procedures parallel and reinforce those normally found in
legal ethics. Legal ethics, then, can be seen as the link between
meaning and doctrine within Batson.
More generally, the Batson doctrine’s means of enforcing
professional norms make more sense than the traditional means of
attorney discipline. For one thing, the difficulty of proving racial and
gender discrimination to a sufficient degree of confidence makes it
dangerous to formally discipline attorneys for violating Batson.78 The
milder sanctions of Batson—reseating of a stricken potential juror,
retrial or appellate court rebuke on appeal—are more appropriate than
any kind of formal punishment.
One reason for preserving the milder sanctions of Batson to more
severe disciplinary penalties is because racial discrimination is often
unwitting and unconscious. The study of cognitive psychology79 has
77

See Berman, supra note __, at 5 (discussing Fallon’s Implementing the
Constitution).
78

In the District of Columbia, however, judges are required to report a finding of a
Batson violation against a particular lawyer to the professional responsibility officer
of the D.C. Bar, who can then consider taking formal action.
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Cognitive psychology is a school of psychology that examines internal mental
processes such as problem solving, memory, and language. Cognitive theory
contends that solutions to problems take the form of algorithms—rules that are not
necessarily understood but promise a solution, or heuristics—rules that are
understood but that do not always guarantee solutions. See A. J. SANFORD,
COGNITION AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1986); H. L. PICK, P. VAN DEN BROEK,
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shown how people use mental shortcuts in reasoning when making
assumptions.80 These mental shortcuts in reasoning, or heuristics, are
present in every aspect of life, including the functioning of criminal
justice system. By shining the spotlight on pretext and bias, Batson
requires lawyers to acknowledge how they impute certain kinds of
assumptions by bringing their mental shortcuts to bear on the
categories of race and gender.
Batson requires the legal profession to recognize the imputations
of race and gender, to confront its attitudes about not just the specific
categories themselves but also about poverty, class subjugation,
immigration, etc. By and through the Batson procedure, the criminal
justice system is forced to recognize the meaning behind these
supposedly neutral categorizations. Through its ethical imperative,
Batson compels lawyers to question those assumptions; to examine
how they came to these mental shortcuts; and to acknowledge how
heuristics based on outdated stereotyping and bias can infect the
criminal jury, even among the most careful and aware.
In short, the Batson procedure forces us to move beyond the
heuristics of race and gender, and into the hard, painful work of
confronting our most basic assumptions. If American society as a
whole is still struggling with the difficult legacies left by slavery,
subjugation and misogyny, then it is unrealistic to expect that these
legacies have not made their way into the courtroom. The Batson
procedure plays its part in this troubling task by focusing lawyers’
vision on the signaling done by race and gender, drawing out the
dialogue to include ethnicity and national origin as we start to think
about these heuristics as well.
This possibility of unconscious discrimination, rooted in
heuristics, provides another reason that violation of the Batson
doctrine should not lead to disbarment, but instead should be enforced
in the courtroom during jury selection. Batson provides a forum in
which to establish a norm that discourages unconscious discrimination,
promoting attorneys’ effort to overcome it.

D. C. KNILL, ed., COGNITION: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
(1992).
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See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & ABC RESEARCH GROUP,
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (Evolution and Cognition Series)
(19__) (arguing as central thesis of book that people cope in real, complex world of
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Finally, enforcing Batson norms through the criminal trial also
provides one of the only feasible ways of inculcating the norm not
only for attorneys, but also for judges. Though discipline of the bench
is possible, it happens only rarely, and usually only when there has
been an extreme violation of legal ethics.81
One scholar has argued that judges “bear substantial responsibility
for the wrongful striking of minority-race jurors in their jurisdictions,
for they have acquiesced to it.”82 Calling for a greater bravery among
judges so they will ask the hard questions of prosecutors, and pointing
out that it “takes courage to take racial issues seriously, and more
courage to do so openly,”83 this scholar contends that the legislature
should make the task of the good prosecutor and trial judge easier by
requiring ethical rules commanding the asking and answering of such
hard questions.84
This sort of legislative activity, however, is unnecessary. Batson’s
ethical imperative, properly understood, is enough to compel ethical
behavior from prosecutors, judges and defense counsel. The very
public nature of the Batson remedy—the invoking of the Batson
challenge—is, in itself, a incentive for professionally responsible
behavior. Because the Batson challenge is taken so seriously by all
parties involved, the ever-present threat of the doctrine serves to
regulate appropriate behavior during jury selection. Additionally, the
judge’s ability to raise a Batson claim sua sponte also creates another
strong incentive for counsel to examine their peremptory challenges
for remnants of bias or unconscious discrimination. No counsel
wishes to start off the trial in a negative light cast by her
discriminatory challenges. Thus, there is no need for legislatures to
require any more rules about Batson than the doctrine already
contains, for Batson, by its very existence, reminds lawyers of the
profession’s ethical aspirations.
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A recent example of criminal jurist prosecution is the indictment of Brooklyn trial
judge Gerald P. Garson, along with six other justices of the Brooklyn Supreme
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D. A Positive Theory of Developing Batson Doctrine
Approaching Batson through the lens of legal ethics provides a
positive theory for the development of the doctrine. Because the
Constitution is the source of Batson’s ethical imperative, it creates
natural limits to its expansion. For example, it is unlikely that Batson
will be extended to include class as a protected category, because there
is no constitutional right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
class, like there is race or gender. Unless new constitutional doctrine
or statutory obligation intercedes, Batson will remain limited to its
current categories of race, gender and ethnicity—as the past ten years
have proven.
At the same time, however, the fact that legal ethics functions
as a model for the Batson doctrine does explain the ways in which
Batson has been extended. Under a theory of legal ethics, it was only
natural that Batson was expanded to include strikes by defense
counsel, since defense counsel, as attorneys, should also be subject to
Batson’s ethical requirements. Likewise, it makes sense that the
Batson doctrine was extended to civil proceedings as well, because
naturally the Court would want to include civil practitioners into this
aspirational theory of legal ethics. Batson’s ethical imperative is a
broad one, inclusive of all attorneys and judges who participate in jury
selection, since ethical behavior obviously includes the civil bar and
bench. Thus, the expansion of Batson to defense counsel and civil
cases was a natural progression of legal ethics—a system focused on
protecting the integrity and reputation of the profession—but one that
has clear boundaries.
Batson’s evolution from its original expression by the Supreme
Court has caused much anxiety and concern among legal scholars,
jurists and practitioners. These anxieties run the gamut from Batson’s
confusing standards, the injection of bias into criminal jury selection,
defense counsel’s unclean hands, the inculcation of bias and
unconscious racism into jury selection, waste of judicial time and
money; and negative public perception of jury selection. As I explain
below, however, many of these anxieties over Batson vanish with a
proper understanding of the doctrine’s aspirational legal imperative.

III. The Evolution of the Peremptory Challenge: How Batson
Changed the Landscape
What can explain all the anxiety about the Batson procedure and
the peremptory challenge? To answer this question, it is helpful to
look at Batson and its most recent progeny. The history of the
peremptory challenge, on these shores and others, has been
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exhaustively documented,85 and need not be rehashed here. A brief
tour through the Supreme Court jurisprudence of Batson, however,
will better ground our discussion of the Batson critiques.
In 1986, the Supreme Court abandoned their previous requirement,
as promulgated in Swain v. Alabama,86 that to prove juror
discrimination, there must be broad historical evidence of racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson v.
Kentucky held that a defendant could overcome the presumption that
peremptory challenges were made legitimately through a three step
process.87
The prohibited discrimination elucidated in Batson, denying
prosecutors the ability to peremptorily-strike members of the same
race as the defendant for racially motivated reasons, was subsequently
extended to protect against peremptory challenges against members of
a racial group different from the defendant.88 In Powers v. Ohio,89 the
Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that the excluded juror be
of the same cognizable racial group as the complaining criminal
defendant.90
That same year, in Edmundson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,91 the
Court extended Batson to include the discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges in civil actions between private litigants. A
year later, in Georgia v. McCollum,92 third-party standing to raise
improper exclusion of potential jurors based on race was extended to
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the prosecution.93 Finally, the Court held in J.E.B. v. Alabama94 that
equal protection bars discrimination in jury selection on the basis of
gender.
Although various lower courts have held that Batson principles
extend to such categories as religion95 or national origin,96 the
Supreme Court has not recently broadened Batson any further. In fact,
the Court declined to extend Batson to Latino and Hispanic jurors in
Hernandez v. New York.97 Despite many predictions of expansion, the
Court has so far resisted the growth of Batson since J.E.B., and the
Batson universe has remained stable for over the past ten years.
IV. Fear and Loathing about Batson: The Prudential Attacks
The first critique against the post-Batson peremptory challenge
came, ironically enough, in one of the Batson concurrences. Although
joining the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall
took time to write a separate concurrence which pointed out that
“[m]erely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will
not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge.” 98
Justice Marshall’s concern that Batson would not eliminate
discrimination was the pre-cursor to many current day worries that
Batson, instead of helping eradicate racial/gender discrimination,
actually helps hide prejudice in socially acceptable forms. Marshall
argued that Batson failed to solve the peremptory problem due to three
93
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major reasons: (1) “trial courts fac[ing] the difficult burden of
assessing prosecutor’s motives;”99 (2) “outright prevarication by
prosecutors”100 and, potentially, defense counsel;101 and (3) coded
racial prejudice, unarticulated—sometimes even subconscious—but
difficult to detect. “‘[S]eat of the pants instincts’ may often be just
another term for racial prejudice.”102
These concerns led Justice Marshall to conclude that the Court
should ideally ban peremptories from the criminal justice system,103 as
the right to peremptory challenges had no “constitutional
magnitude”104 and could be “withheld altogether;”105 only by “banning
peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended.”106
Justice Marshall’s concurrence presciently anticipated many of
the current concerns about Batson and the peremptory challenge.
What Justice Marshall did not anticipate, however, was how highly
evolved the Batson procedure has become, creating a more carefully
crafted tool than what was Supreme Court initially drafted almost 20
years ago. With Justice Marshall as our Virgil,107 we will walk
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through the long list of grievances documented against the Batson
procedure to better understand why the Batson procedure and the
peremptory challenge have managed to stir up such fear, confusion
and concern. Moreover, our tour through the Batson grievance list
will provide another opportunity to better explicate the doctrine’s
theory of legal ethics.
A. Batson has confusing standards
1. “Muddled” procedures cause judicial uncertainty
One complaint that Justice Marshall did not foresee was the
growing concern about how to interpret and apply Batson. This antiBatson complaint theorizes that judicial understanding of Batson is in
a state of disarray.108 Therefore, the argument goes, if jurists cannot
understand how to apply and use Batson properly, it is unlikely
prosecutors and defense counsel could do so.
Putting aside the perhaps unintended slight to practitioners’
capabilities, this concern has been raised primarily by jurists and legal
scholars. The gravamen of this complaint is that Batson and
peremptory challenges should be abolished because standards are a
muddle, and it is impossible to apply Batson correctly and fairly. For
example, one jurist109 in Wamget v. Texas argued that peremptory
challenges “do not further [the] goal” of ensuring that venirepersons
can be “fair and impartial,”110 pinning the blame directly on Batson’s
tail:
Moreover, Batson and its progeny, have made a further
muck of things by transforming voir dire into a lengthy
ordeal involving inquiries into inappropriate questions of
race and ethnicity that not only have nothing to do with
impartiality, but will also become increasing muddled in
the face of our changing society.111

Likewise, I hope to use Justice Marshall’s concurrence as a guide to the variety of
complaints against Batson and the peremptory challenge.
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It is this fear of “muddle” which has seemingly touched off a firestorm
of dislike for Batson and peremptory challenges.
Wamget raises a variety of reasons about why the peremptory
challenge should be abolished,112 but most interesting is the concern
about confusing standards. The concurrence argues that the problem of
“defining a cognizable racial/ethnic group”113 is so great that it
becomes “either absurd or nearly impossible.”114 Using the Hispanic
classification as example, Wamget notes how difficult it can be to
determine Latino ancestry from definable physical characteristics,
surname or language.115
Having identified this potential problem of definition, Wamget
then moves on to another potential problem, distastefulness, observing
how it, and other courts, has “viewed the prospect of making ethnic
assessments particularly distasteful and inappropriate.”116 Wamget
then morphs back into its original concern that a logical extension of
Batson will eventually cover every identifiable group, rolling down the
slippery slope into confusion and chaos.117
By conflating these two issues of definition and distastefulness,
however, Wamget muddies—or muddles—the waters itself. The
“slippery slope” concern over expanding group classifications is
distinct from the dislike the courts have for entering into any
cogitation about race, ethnicity or gender, 118 and it is unfair for the
court to mix the two together into one. Although a potential concern
over growing elaborations of classifications is valid enough, simply
112
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Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory,
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). I discuss
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because the judiciary dislikes grappling with one of the singular issues
of our time is not a good enough reason to eliminate the peremptory
challenge.
Wamget returns to the problem of confusing standards in the
final point of the concurrence, when the procedure is criticized for
creating a situation where “courts’ attempts at applying Batson, and in
particular, at assessing the existence of pretext, are ‘all over the
map.’”119 It is this very specter of chaos which has galvanized the
judiciary into fearful prophecy and action; not only do they fear their
own inability to consistently apply Batson over time, but they also fear
the idea of failed uniformity among all courts.120 Despite grudgingly
recognizing that they are dealing with categories—race and gender—
which may defy easy and uniform black-line rules, the judiciary’s
discomfort with a lack of “legality”121 had led them to proselytize a
complete abolition of the peremptory challenge.
Other jurists have similarly used the rallying cry of “confusing
standards” as reason to eliminate the peremptory challenge. In
Minetos v. CUNY,122 the court123 spent much of its opinion discussing
its concern over judicial misunderstanding of the Batson procedure,
which, it concluded, invokes no less of a danger than “invit[ing]
corruption of the judicial process.”124 After citing Justice Marshall’s
warning about the dangers of the peremptory challenge, the court
jumps straight to its own heart of darkness:125 the uncertainty and
confusion it locates squarely in Batson and progeny.
Arguing that “[a] brief review of the case law shows that
judicial interpretations of Batson are all over the map,”126 the Minetos
court goes through a representative sample of federal Batson cases,
with minimal case details, in an attempt to show how courts are very
bad at “guess[ing]” which are the pretextual reasons and which are
119
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not.127 Minetos’s laundry-list of supposedly wildly varying standards
can be seen as pretext for an attempt to reduce race and gender, and
the social constructs underlying them, to an almost childlike
simplicity.
The Minetos court also raises some concern over New York
state courts’ attempt to hammer out some guidelines to applying
Batson’s second step of separating pretext from reasonable.128 The
court’s concern over New York’s promulgated guidelines contrasts to
its previous concern over the marked lack of standards for
distinguishing pretexual from race-neutral reasons in Batson. So
although the Minetos court claimed to want clear, bright-line rules for
the application of the Batson challenge, when given some, its critical
reaction illustrates some discomfort with the race and gender aspects
of Batson.
State court jurists have also recently called for the abolition of
the peremptory challenge due to this concern over muddled standards
as well. In a recent case,129 the chief judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, in an impassioned concurrence, denounced peremptory
challenges and the Batson procedure as distorting the fundamental
fairness of the jury process.130 Highlighting an agreement with Justice
Marshall, the chief judge states, somewhat reluctantly, that “[t]he
intense focus on factors such as skin color, accent and surname in jury
selection is wholly at odds with our societal goal of dealing with
people as individuals, on their personal qualities.”131 The chief judge’s
concern over the “opportunity for mischief”132 with Batson and
peremptories can be interpreted, among other things, as a concern over
the standards regulating peremptory challenges under the Batson
procedure. The chief judge concludes the only solution is that
peremptory challenges should be either severely reduced or eliminated
entirely.133
New York jurists have often found fault with Batson over
muddled standards. In 1990, another member of the New York Court
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of Appeals134 suggested in a concurrence that the number of
peremptories in New York should be dramatically reduced, if not
eliminated entirely.135 Citing the complexity of the Batson procedure
and “the very profound difficulties”136 involved in “reconciling a juror
challenge system that is theoretically based on the attorney's
inexplicable personal hunch with a constitutional rule that requires
attorneys to offer satisfactory "neutral" explanations for their
choices,”137 this jurist criticized the current procedure as confusing and
then argues that despite all its complexity, it does not do its job in
unmasking racial discrimination.138 This solution spurns the idea of
working with the Batson procedure as too hard, messy and confusing
for attorneys and jurists; instead of “developing a complex set of
judicially imposed limitations and standards,”139 the strong pruning of
the right to peremptory challenge or the wholesale elimination of the
tool were offered.
Similarly, two years later, yet another jurist of the New York
Court of Appeals140 argued that Batson had failed to wipe
discrimination from the jury selection process.141 Writing a separate
concurrence to “express a broader concern and perspective,”142 this
jurist criticizes the Batson procedure for failing to eliminate
discrimination, claiming that the procedure actually assists in
disguising impermissible racial motives instead of helping reduce
them.143 By arguing that “[t]he process that requires courts to sift
through counsel's words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination has
not served the goal of cutting the discriminatory weeds out of the jury
selection process,”144 the so-called failure of the Batson procedure is
134
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blamed on the allegedly confusing standards and complexity of the
process.
Although discussing some other reasons for his dislike of
Batson,145 this New York jurist returned to a “seemingly endless
variety of issues and permutations, manifesting the intractable struggle
of the lower courts to implement the unmanageable and selfcontradictory Batson remedy”146 as one of the primary concerns and
reasons to remove the peremptory challenge entirely. Likening the
ever-evolving Batson procedure to a Sisyphisean effort to “push the
stone up the mountain”147 the procedure is lambasted as an
“unworkable remedy,”148 “impractical”149 and consisting of standards
of “woeful unevenness”150—a procedure too complicated for either
state or federal trial judges.151
Legal scholars have complained about confusing standards as
well. They have argued that trial courts have had difficulty
distinguishing neutral from pretextual explanations in the Batson
procedure.152 One pair of scholars argues that the peremptory
challenge has resulted in confusion among state and federal court in
determining which groups are protected from its nondiscriminatory
application.153 As one commentator puts it, “Batson is an
uncontrollable beast that eventually, but lamentably, will destroy the
peremptory challenge.”154
These reactions illustrate how the fear of Batson and the
peremptory challenge outmatches the reality of any actual problems
Batson might create. In all of the above cases, such radical solutions
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to the Batson “problem” exemplifies the discomfort caused by the
emergence of race or gender in the courtroom. For these critics, it
seems, it is easier to eliminate these procedures entirely than to
confront, head on, the realities of discrimination in the criminal justice
system. Instead, the call for the abolition of the peremptory challenge
based on the straw men of “confusing standards,” messiness or
complexity belies a discomfort with confronting the realities of race,
ethnicity and gender as manifested in the courtroom and within the
criminal jury.
This is where the legal ethics approach proves its usefulness.
Most of these “judicial uncertainty” critics argue that bias is
irretrievably intertwined into the use of peremptory challenge, and no
possible procedure or doctrine could eliminate it. The legal ethics
approach, however, recognizes that the ethical imperative and
aspirational standard provided by Batson is enough to overcome most
of these potential uses of bias in jury selection. The bias critics
shortchange both judges and attorneys by assuming that the normative
framework imposed by Batson has no power to compel and encourage
appropriate, non-discriminatory behavior.
It is true that courts and counsel may occasionally have
difficulty in distinguishing neutral from pretextual strikes. The legal
ethics approach recognizes, however, that this is not a reason either to
abandon the attempt to safeguard a non-discriminatory jury selection
process or to jettison a legal procedure—the peremptory challenge—
that is generally credited with improving jury selection and, later on,
jury deliberations. The simple creation of an ethical standard and a
procedure for considering whether that standard has been followed
may substantially increase compliance, even if there will inevitably be
false positives and negatives in particular cases.
2. Who is a “protected group:” concern over expanding group
classifications
The second piece of the concern over “confusing standards” is
focused on what some jurists and academics see as a never-ending
expansion of group classifications which are protected by Batson.
This is a classic manifestation of the slippery slope argument alluded
to above, where opponents of Batson and the peremptory challenge
argue that because the Batson procedure has slowly expanded to
include gender and ethnicity, it will soon grow to include all possible
difference,155 thus becoming completely unworkable.
155

Any discussion of race or gender difference is incomplete without mentioning
difference feminism. Though too complex a topic to explore in this article,
difference theory posits that women have deep–rooted and partly biological gender
differences separating them from men. See DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING:
FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1990); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT

33

Another prominent jurist,156 a recent convert (in his own
words) to abolishing the peremptory challenge, sees this as a major
concern, arguing that the Batson procedure and peremptory challenge
should be banished from the criminal justice system. Gloomily
predicting that the “mutations to Batson are probably far from
over,”157 this judge predicts that Batson will soon be extended beyond
race and sex to include, among other things, religion and national
origin, since the latter are two classifications traditionally deemed
“suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause.158
Interestingly, some judges are somewhat more comfortable
with the idea of national origin becoming one of Batson’s protected
classes.159 One jurist points out that often national origin is used as a
de facto suspect class, since courts regularly treat “Hispanic” as a race
for Batson purposes,160 without distinguishing between different
national origins within the category.161 Although noting that extending
Batson to national origin162 would “unleash an unseemly and
uncontrollable parade of horribles,”163 this judge seems to accept that
most courts want to avoid this problem by disguising national origin as
race and ethnicity.164
Despite acknowledging that logic would probably compel
Batson’s extension to national origin,165 however, this same jurist
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refuses to recognize the indeterminacy of race and ethnicity in the first
place.166 By desiring a bright-line rule distinguishing race, on the one
hand, and national origin, on the other, this judge falls into the same
old trap that the majority of peremptory challenge abolitionists fall:
that is, a disinclination to deal with the realities of race and ethnicity,
which cannot be separated from the contours of national origin.
Something as slippery as the concept of racial and ethnic identity
simply cannot be categorized by legalistic, bright-line rules. So
although the judge is correct that national origin, itself an amorphous
category, should be considered a suspect class for Batson, his dislike
of a possible Batson expansion simply belies a common
misunderstanding of the complicated ramifications of racial/ethnic
categorization in modern American life.
The expansion of the Batson challenge to religion is sometimes
deemed “most problematic of all.”167
Despite current judicial
disinclination, on both the state and federal level, to extend Batson to
religious belief,168 some worry that if religion, a First Amendment
right, becomes a protected class under Batson, then there will be no
stopping the tide, forcing courts to protect other “particular
philosophical or political belief[s].”169 There is a particular terror
about the enmeshing of First Amendment law with the jury trial, which
claims that “[o]nce a prospective juror’s general beliefs are declared
out of bounds for peremptories, only the tiniest informational
platforms will be left from which counsel will be able to take their
insupportable and illogical leaps into folk wisdom.”170
Other critics argue that a “further logical extension” of Batson
would include applying its protections to other jurors’ First
Amendment rights.171 They contend that “once the door is open to
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protecting jurors’ religious freedoms, then their speech and association
freedoms should similarly be protected.”172
The fear of an expanding Batson is shared by many legal
scholars. One critic, who also wants to abolish the peremptory
challenge, identifies disability, age, wealth, religious affiliation and
sexual orientation as possible future protected groups.173 This critic
argues that the Supreme Court’s focus “has shifted from the guarantee
of a party to a fair trial by an impartial jury to the protection of equal
protection rights of excluded jurors to be free from improper
discrimination,”174 since she foresees any classification requiring strict
or heightened scrutiny as soon to require Batson protection as well.175
Similarly, another critic argues that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Batson line of case cannot logically be limited to
peremptory exclusions based on race and gender.176 Citing standard
constitutional jurisprudence, this scholar posits that the Batson
rationale should prevent the peremptory removal of jurors because of
their political views, group memberships, prior involvement with the
justice system, to take a few examples.177 In attempting to reconcile
the fair cross-section of the jury doctrine with Batson jurisprudence,178
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panel is impartial; when actually seating a jury, however, he
may not take these same characteristics into account. He may
not base his peremptory strikes on the very same proxy for
viewpoints that the Court has already used to justify the crosssection requirement, even if his efforts are designed to bring
about the exact benefit that the cross-section requirement
provides. An attempt to support the cross-section requirement
on impartiality grounds thus runs headlong into the rule that race
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which would result in a more robust Sixth Amendment and Batson
doctrine, he sees part of the cost of this reconciliation as the death of
This critic does not mourn the
the peremptory challenge.179
peremptory challenge’s death, because he sees the value added by
peremptory strikes as, at best, taking an already fair jury and making it
fairer.180
Much of this criticism can be seen as an outgrowth of the
anxiety Batson creates. There is no sign that any court in any
jurisdiction is planning to substitute the protected groups of Batson
with either the protected groups of the First Amendment or of Title
VII. The tactics of these Batson opponents do cause some concern.
By conflating two different theories into one—specifically, the
theories underlying the protected groups of the First Amendment with
the theories underlying the suspect classification of Batson and, more
broadly, Title VII—these anti-Batson activists are trying to prompt the
banning of peremptories.
Critical race theory is a useful analytical structure to
understand the slippery slope argument.181 Critical race theory posits
that racial and gender identity is fluid, resisting easy categorization.
The slippery slope concern with expanding Batson categorizations is
really a concern about the fluidity of identity, particularly the fluidity
of racial identity. The current categories of Batson—race, gender, and
sometimes ethnicity—are problematic to these critics because of their
lack of defined boundaries.182 This, however, is less a problem with

or gender may not be used as a substitute for inclinations, biases,
or possible votes.
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179

Leipold, supra note __, at 949.

180

Leipold, supra note __, at 982.

181

For a survey of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
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For example, often blacks, Hispanics, and Asians can “pass” for white.
Moreover, when a potential juror has mixed-race ancestry, it is sometimes difficult
to determine, without asking, to which racial or ethnic group the potential
venireperson belongs. This should not be seen as a reason to eliminate the
peremptory challenge, however. Batson forces us to recognize race and gender in
jury selection—specifically, the fluidity of racial and gender roles in our society.
As much as we would like to easily place people—let along venirepersons—into
simple, definable categories, racial and gender identity resist this categorization.
For more on the fluidity of racial identity, see generally IAN F.H. LOPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1996).
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Batson than with our systems of social categorization.183 As one
theorist notes, we “need to account for multiple grounds of identity
when considering how the social world is constructed.”184
As one commentator has observed, “Because race exists as an
integral, structural component of social reality and human relations,
racial remediation is impossible except in the company of wideranging social reform and human advancement.”185 Batson requires
this sort of racial and gender remediation every time the doctrine is
invoked because it forces an examination of the fluidity of race and
gender, which themselves are socially constructed terms.186 It is
important to openly discuss race and gender—and the intersection of
race and gender187--during criminal jury selection as part of the
183

Of course, as Lopez argues, the law itself plays a large role in reifying racial
identities:
Race suffuses all bodies of law, not only obvious ones like civil
rights, immigration law, and federal Indian law, but also property
law, contracts law, criminal law, federal courts, family law, and even
"the purest of corporate law questions within the most
unquestionably Anglo scholarly paradigm." I assert that no body of
law exists untainted by the powerful astringent of race in our society.
Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, supra note __, at 3.
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Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an
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Both critical race and feminist theorists have noted the problem of
intersectionality when discussing identity. As Serena Mayeri observes, “Kimberle
Crenshaw, Angela Harris, Regina Austin and other intersectionality theorists have
exposed the tendency of antiracist and feminist discourses to ignore and erase
women of color by imagining men as the quintessential targets of race
discrimination, and white women as the classic sex discrimination victims.” Serena
Mayeri, Note, Race-Gender Analogies, 110 Yale L. J. 1045, 1049-50 (2001). Since
courts tend to recognize targets of discrimination solely on the basis of belonging to
a specific protected class, intersectionality seeks to broaden antidiscrimination law’s
response to groups as who fall in both protected classes. Intersectionality affects
Batson because of Batson’s focus on race and gender; when a Batson challenge is
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attempt to eradicate racism and sexism within the criminal justice
system.188
Though there is a genuine issue regarding where to draw the
line in extending the Batson challenge, these types of slippery slope
arguments which either obfuscate the complexity of racial and ethnic
categories or deliberately confuse suspect classification with protected
groups are a bit disingenuous. What these critics of Batson fail to
realize is that like everything else in the criminal justice system, the
Batson procedure and peremptory challenge as they currently stand
provide counsel the freedom to select a fair, impartial jury within a
more rigid set of rules and procedures. Defense counsel do not have
total freedom to strike any juror they want, nor are they totally rulebound as to who they might discard. Criminal procedure, like many
other things in our rule of law, is a living, flexible institution,
providing much more stability—and, paradoxically—freedom than
these critics will admit.
Moreover, as I discuss infra Part I(d), because the Constitution
is the source of Batson’s ethical imperative, this limits the categories
to which the doctrine can be expanded. For example, despite fears of
the slippery slope critics, class is unlikely to be added to the Batson
pantheon of protected classifications, because class is not protected by
the Equal Protection Doctrine. The same argument can be extended
to religion; although religion is protected by the First Amendment, it is
not covered by the Fourteenth. Since Batson doctrine is rooted firmly
in the 14th Amendment (indeed, the Court rejected using Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence to bolster the doctrine),189 it is highly

raised, lawyers are forced to examine their belief systems not only about the
separate categories of race or gender separately, but also how race and sex
discrimination are often intertwined. For a comprehensive bibliography of
intersectionality
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Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539; Kimberle Crenshaw,
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In this way, I follow the path of Lopez and Mari Matsuda in “attempting to
develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and
that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating
all forms of subordination." Mari Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
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petitioner’s claim properly turns on application of equal protection principles and
express no view on the merits of any of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment arguments”).
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unlikely that the Court will forbid striking jurors on religious grounds,
because there is no constitutional basis for doing so.
Finally, as one prominent scholar has noted, “Lincoln, Holmes,
and Frankfurter have recognized [that] slippery slope arguments are of
limited utility.”190 Although the metaphor of the slippery slope
suggests that there’s only one way through which the slippage
happens, there are actually many different ways that decision A (here,
Batson forbidding strikes based on race and gender) can make decision
B (Batson forbidding strikes based on class) more likely.191 However,
many of these ways have little to do with the mechanisms that people
often think about when confronted with the “slippery slope.”192
This scholar discusses “judicial-judicial slippery slopes, ” the
mechanism of slippery slope that is operating here.193 Batson critics
use a “legal effect slippery slope” mechanism by arguing that because
decision B follows from decision A, court will feel bound to follow
decision B simply as an application of an existing legal rule (the
obligation to follow precedent).194 As this scholar points out,
however, “this legal effect slippery slope doesn’t by itself provide
much of an argument against result A, because advocates of A could
simply urge that courts decide A based on a narrower justification that
avoids the excessive breadth or the added authority.”195
This is precisely the case with the Batson slippery slope
argument. The slippery slope critics argue that Batson will soon be
broadened to include, say, religion because the Constitution, through
the First Amendment, forbids prejudice on the basis of religion.
Batson, however, is based on a different constitutional justification—
the Equal Protection Clause—which avoids the potential excessive
breadth of the doctrine about which the critics are so concerned.196
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Of course, as Volokh argues, “a judge deciding whether to adopt proposed
principle A may worry that future judges, who have their own understandings of
equality or administrability that the original judge does not share, might deliberately
broaden B. And there’s little that the original judge can do when adopting A to
prevent this broadening.” Id. at 4b. This issue is not likely to affect Batson
doctrine, however, since not only is it unclear whether the Batson Court considered
slippery slopes when initially fashioning the doctrine, it also is unlikely that any
current Courts would not follow the line of Batson jurisprudence already
promulgated, none of which falls down the slippery slope.
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B. Batson wastes time and money
Another common complaint against the peremptory challenge
and the Batson procedure is that both waste valuable court time by
slowing down the jury selection process. Jurists argued this point from
the beginning, claiming that the “already unduly lengthened jury
selection process”197 will be further fragmented and interrupted by
Batson.198 This vision of never-ending jury selection is also echoed by
Texas jurists,199 one of whom argued that “Batson claims will
inevitably grow in number, compelling hour upon hour of inquiry into
venirepersons’ ethnic backgrounds and heritage and further inquiry
into the supposed thoughts and impulses of the proponent of the strike,
issues that are irrelevant to juror impartiality.”200 New York jurists201
have raised concerns about the “huge, expensive waste of juror
time,”202 and conceptualized it as a public problem. And no less a
figure than Justice Scalia has expressed worry that expanding the
Batson doctrine would add “another complexity to an increasingly
Byzantine system of justice that devotes more and more of its energy
to sideshows and less to the merits of the case.”203
Fewer legal scholars are worried about the aspect of timewasting. Those who have raised the concern have focused on “the
procedural morass”204 Batson has allegedly created in the trial courts
as well as “the clogged dockets”205 of the appellate courts when
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contested Batson issues are appealed. As the one pair of critics argues,
the current form of the peremptory challenge results in mini-hearings
and potential appeals on each strike, and the efficacy of the procedure
is highly questionable.206 Underlining the administrative costs207 of
Batson disputes, these concerns value expediency over due process,
costs over defendants’ rights.
What these complaints all share is a refusal to recognize the
importance of criminal jury selection as not only a constitutional due
process right of the defendant but an important way for the public to
participate in the process of criminal justice. Although further
safeguards and procedures may indeed lengthen the average time of a
criminal jury trial, thus costing the states and federal government
money, this is not all bad. By forcing the criminal justice system to
spend time, effort and money on choosing an impartial jury, Batson
helps signal to everyone that fairness and procedural due process is an
intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, one that cannot be shunted
off by hasty or careless selection of venirepersons.
The spectacle of criminal justice, as enacted in the criminal
jury room, is sometimes just as important as the implementation of
such justice. The careful procedures of Batson and the laws
surrounding the use of peremptory challenges ensure that criminal jury
selection is always first and foremost in the collective societal mind.
The importance of illustrating the primacy of jury selection, no matter
what the costs, ties into the theory of moral lawyering referenced
above. A lawyer with integrity and moral character understands that
sometimes judicial resources must be spent to ensure not only the
actuality of fairness and justice, but the display of it as well. Because
the right to participate in the jury is a right not only of the defendant
but also the potential juror and the community at large, it is worth
occasionally halting the adversarial process that marks the rest of the
jury trial for an exercise in ethics, fairness and non-discriminatory
norms.
If lawyers have “tremendous responsibility for the
administration of justice,”208 then the Batson procedure, despite its use
of judicial time and money, is one way to ensure lawyers have greater
moral accountability for non-discriminatory behavior in jury selection.
C. Peremptory challenges inject bias into judicial proceedings
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The “Batson causes bias” concern is also prominent among both
jurists and legal scholars. The “bias” concern seeks to pin all the bias
potentially inherent in criminal jury selection on the Batson procedure
itself. Bias is a particularly great concern within jury selection
because of the right to an impartial jury; an indispensable component
of the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is the elimination of biased
jurors.209 Thus, there is a tension between Batson’s antidiscrimination
principle (permitting striking of potential jurors only for
constitutionally-permitted reasons) and the general principle of
peremptory challenges (encouraging striking of potential jurors due to
their bias or favoritism).210
The bias concern is prevalent among legal scholars and jurists.
Among jurists, a common worry is a fear of hidden motives among
both defense counsel and prosecutors. To put it another way, there is
fear that criminal lawyers will mask their true intentions with
believable, if false, race-neutral reasoning. As one jurist put it,
“Batson brings to the surface and appears to ratify crude and
unbecoming ways of classifying human beings and to disapprove some
individious discrimination while apparently validating much more.”211
This judge argues that the Batson procedure’s three-step process has
become less an obstacle to racial discrimination than a “road map” to
disguised discrimination.212 Many members of the judiciary believe
peremptories to be “probably the single most significant means by
which such prejudice and bias are injected into the jury selection
system,”213 and therefore should be eliminated.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Purkett v. Elem214 has been
criticized by many as furthering hidden discrimination in jury
selection.215 Purkett relaxed the second stage of Batson’s burdenshifting analysis, holding that a litigant’s explanation for a peremptory
challenge did not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible” for it to be
legitimate.216 Purkett clarified that a legitimate reason does not have
to make sense, but only has to be one that “does not deny equal
protection.”217 Scholars claim that this clarification of the Batson
doctrine has created confusion among the lower courts, as
theoretically, any reason would now satisfy Batson’s second step.218
Among scholars, there has been some exploration into what
“pretext” really means. In her examination of the meaning of
“pretext” and “discriminatory intent,” one scholar argues that there
will always be some amount of deception and discrimination in jury
selection.219 Although a finding of pretext may serve as very strong
evidence of unconstitutional discriminatory intent, the two do not
necessary correlate—either there can be pretext without discrimination
or discrimination without pretextual findings.220
The nuances of discriminatory behavior in jury selection, whether
overt or unconscious or some combination of the two, are also of much
interest.221 Critics fear that though courts can occasionally “smoke
out” instances or self-deception or “unconscious racism,” the trial
court is ultimately unable to find and recognize bias, arguing that selfdeception on the part of attorneys is so difficult to identify that a court
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would be hard-pressed to uncover it through the mask of an allegedly
race-neutral reason.222
Certain scholars claim that peremptories not only instill bias but
also fail to do their job. Some argue that peremptories are not “a
narrowly tailored way” of advancing the removal of jurors at the ends
of the bias spectrum.223 Criticizing peremptories as “exercised in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, based on sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices, which are often crudely stereotypical and
may in many cases be hopelessly mistaken,”224 a critic contends that
peremptories only mildly advance lawyers’ goals.225
Another critic charges that the Batson process has become a
charade, arguing that “any experienced trial attorney” would know
better than to state any preference for or aversion to a particular race,
gender or ethnicity.226 This critic contends that these same trial
attorneys can easily undermine any trial judge’s attempted
examination of the unstated or subconscious.227
Other commentators have concluded that peremptory challenges
do more harm than good because their discriminatory use outweighs
any helpful use they might have.228 One observes that in considering
the various roles we expect the jury to fulfill, we must consider
whether the peremptory challenge hinders or helps the jury to fulfill
those roles.229 This critic contends that peremptory challenges “permit
discrimination in a setting that should be free from all
discrimination,”230 and that sort of discrimination—i.e., counsel’s
choice in shaping the jury—should not be allowed for anyone,
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constitutionally protected group or not. All peremptory challenges,
permissible or not, are criticized as rooted in outdated and incorrect
stereotypes handed down from trial manuals and fellow litigators.231
Once peremptory challenges are removed, it is argued, a jury would be
fully heterogeneous and free from bias.232
Implicit bias regarding race and gender pervades every aspect of
our social discourse, however.233 This includes the criminal justice
system as well. Blaming the Batson procedure and the peremptory
challenge for all of the instances of bias present in criminal jury
selection is a classic example of throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. As legal scholars have come to realize, “Race colors law,
crime, and community.”234 Simply eliminating Batson will not erase
race or gender from the criminal jury selection process.
This is not to say that some of the concerns raised above about
counsel using peremptory challenges improperly—consciously or
unconsciously—do not exist. Undoubtedly these examples persevere,
and occasionally a potential juror may be struck for impermissible
reasons that are not remedied by the Batson procedure. However, the
sometimes failure of a useful remedy does not justify the wholesale
elimination of not only the remedy but also the tool itself.
Additionally, as I discuss above, because discrimination can be
unconscious and implicit, Batson provides the best forum to establish a
norm that attorneys should seek to overcome it. By inculcating a nondiscrimination norm, Batson encourages lawyers and judges to root out
their potentially discriminatory thoughts and deeds to meet the
doctrine’s ethical aspirations.

D. Defense counsel’s improper use of peremptory challenges and
manipulation of the Batson procedure
Both legal scholars and jurists have argued that the Batson
procedure can be taken advantage of by defense counsel. One way
defense counsel misuse Batson, it is argued,235 is by implanting
reversible error into the trial by striking jurors on impermissible bases,
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slipping these impermissible reasons by the trial court through the use
of allegedly race-neutral reasons, and then taking advantage of the trial
court’s failure to see through these false reasons to obtain a new
trial.—what I dub the “unclean hands” issue.
This particular concern is born out of the circuit split between
the Fifth and Seventh Circuit over whether a defendant may receive a
new trial based on the discriminatory peremptory strikes of her own
defense counsel.236 In United States v. Huey,237 the Fifth Circuit held
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to protect the
equal protection rights of the five black jurors who were peremptorily
challenged by the defense.238 Because the trial court “failed to
discharge its clear duty” either to elicit a race-neutral explanation for
the peremptory challenges or deny the use of those challenges, Huey
found that the trial court committed reversible error in implicitly
determining that the equal protection rights of these jurors has not
been violated, requiring a new trial.239 Although acknowledging the
irony in reversing the defendant’s conviction given that it was his
counsel who made the discriminatory strikes, the Huey court was
convinced that the result was consistent with the teachings of Batson,
since, “[i]n addition to harming individual defendants and prospective
jurors, racial discrimination in the selection of jurors impugns the
integrity of the judicial system and the community at large.”240
The Seventh Circuit, however, in United States v. Boyd,241
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit on whether a defendant should get a
new trial when her own counsel has committed the discriminatory
strikes. Boyd held that the defense counsel’s improper use of
peremptory challenges did not warrant a new trial absent ineffective
assistance of counsel, arguing that the defendant could not protest, on
appeal, his own agent’s “tactical decision.”242
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Boyd raised the prospect that many a Batson critic has echoed:
Many a defendant would like to plant an error and grow a
risk- free trial: an acquittal is irrevocable under the
double jeopardy clause, and a conviction can be set aside.
But steps the court takes at the defendant’s behest are not
reversible, because they are not error; even the “plain
error” doctrine does not ride to the rescue when the
choice has been made deliberately, and the right in
question has been waived rather than forfeited.243
By assuming that the defendant is interchangeable with her counsel,244
and further assuming that both defense counsel and defendants would
do practically anything to get off scot-free, ethical or no, the Boyd
court neatly summarizes the prevailing attitude of the “unclean hands”
complaint: that defense counsel are not to be trusted.
Another, more general concern over defense counsel tactics is
their alleged ability to twist the Batson procedure to their nefarious
ways, despite the eyes of the prosecutor and the trial court. For
example, Justice Thomas, in Miller- El v. Cockrel, argued that one
reason to ignore the jury shuffling in the case was that the defense
allegedly used the tactic itself to eliminate whites from the jury.245
These critiques evince a larger distrust of defense counsel, who
are believed to be unethical bottom-feeders who would do anything to
win their cases. Not only does this view do damage to the general
view of criminal defense attorneys, but it injures the reputation of all
who practice within the criminal justice system. By alleging that
criminal defense counsel are so evasive and untruthful as to be able to
fool prosecutors and trial courts, doubt is cast on the abilities of the
latter. The “unclean hands” critique insults the entire criminal legal
profession.
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The reasoning in Boyd, however, is not wholly bereft of ethical
utility. Based on the legal ethics framework, the Seventh Circuit’s
approach makes the most “ethical sense” to the unclean hands
problem. The problem, ethically, with Huey’s approach is that it is too
obsessed with assuring that there is a remedy for every wrong. In the
process, the Fifth Circuit has created a right that threatens to create
tension among the different legal ethical obligations of defense
counsel. Acting in the best interest of the client, with the Huey
approach, would seem to require the lawyer to violate Batson to create
an appealable issue. This leads to the adversarial framework of
lawyering that causes so much concern to current legal ethics scholars,
and undermines the moral integrity that I locate within the Batson
doctrine.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s approach would still
command that trial courts consider strikes by defense counsel. This
approach would not, however, entertain the admittedly paradoxical
spectacle of defendants complaining about their lawyers striking jurors
in their own favor, even based on discriminatory reasoning. To
encourage, even mildly, defense counsel to act amorally in service of
their clients would create “‘extreme partisanship’ on behalf of the
client and ‘moral non-accountability’ for the lawyer's actions in pursuit
of the client's goals.”246 This is precisely what Batson discourages.
Batson doctrine, by promoting ethical integrity and non-discriminatory
behavior, endorses an attorney’s personal moral responsibility, which
would preclude acting unethically even in zealous advocacy for the
client.
E. “Whose right is it anyway:”247 negative public perception of the
criminal jury process
The Supreme Court has observed that discrimination in jury
selection causes harm to the litigants, the community and the
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in
the judicial process.248 “[J]ury service—a privilege and duty of
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citizenship— [is a] fundamental means of participating in
government.”249 There is no question that there is a public right to
serve on the jury,250 and that this right must be balanced against the
defendant’s right to an impartial jury.
Various critics of Batson and the peremptory challenge,
however, have so enshrined the public’s right to serve on a jury that it
trumps the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. As a jury trial
scholar has noted, “[t]he goal of protecting those summoned to serve,
once a background feature, has now moved to the center of the
analysis.”251
One prominent critic, for example, in her observation that two
competing visions of the jury underlie the debate about peremptory
challenges, argues that the image of the jury as a public institution
should predominate, because the community that can potentially serve
on the jury has changed over time, from white men to all citizens, and
if the jury is to reflect a heterogeneous society, exclusion by
peremptory should be unacceptable.252 She also contends that the
struggle of certain groups to serve on the jury has given an additional
meaning to jury service, which not also “signifies the political acts of
belonging to a community and participating as a full and equal
citizen.”253 This scholar concludes that re-imagining the jury without
the peremptory would allow her “vision of the jury as a public
institution” to thrive.254
unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which
reasonable persons could disagree.
Id. at 141-42.
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Likewise, another Batson critic contends that the real harm in
racially motivated jury selection is incurred by the excluded jurors and
the stigmatized group to which they belong.255 This scholar contends
that there is no satisfactory way to explain how "race-based jury
selection discriminates against the defendant, as distinct from the
jurors."256 Flipping the traditional view of jury selection on its head,
she basically argues in favor of treating racial discrimination as a
violation of jurors’, rather than litigants’ rights.257
Interesting, the public also possesses specificviews on the ir
right to serve on a jury. A recent newspaper article documented how
82% of all New York State jurors called for jury service never make it
past voir dire, and how the rates elsewhere in the country are not much
better.258 This “82% problem” was so disturbing to the New York
judiciary that they formed the Commission on the Jury; “having so
many people report to the jury room only to be rejected in voir dire
leaves the public with a negative impression of what it means to
perform one of the core duties of citizenship.”259 The Commission is
currently considering whether to reduce the number of peremptory
challenges in New York criminal cases.260
A recent scholarly study of juror attitudes towards the criminal
jury and the peremptory challenge observed that according to the
Batson critics, “the net result of all these problems with the
peremptory is the creation of an embittered and cynical group of
former jurors.”261 This study documented how these critics believe
that citizens who observe modern jury selection practices are disgusted
as they watch the adversarial process of jury selection--particularly the
excused, who are especially resentful.262
The study pointed out, however, that despite the worry that
excused jurors see triviality in selection decisions, feel unfairly treated,
and look down on the courts, when the actual jurors themselves were
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surveyed, “the perceived reasons for being excused were not
associated with ratings of being treated fairly, overall satisfaction, or
willingness to serve on a jury in the future.”263 Additionally, although
the peremptory challenge was rarely mentioned as a symbol of
unfairness, the study found that jurors were critical of aspects of the
challenge for cause, particularly the hardship exemptions.264 The study
concluded that the public is relatively accepting towards voir dire and
its practices, and that the peremptory challenge causes little harm to
the views of those excused.265
This last study showsthat the concept of the jury as a public
institution does not need to eliminate the peremptory—or the rights of
the defendant—to protect the public right to serve on a jury. Though
scholars are correct to observe that the jury plays a critical role in
deciding cases that articulate public values,266 Batson and the
peremptory challenge actually help keep the delicate balance between
the needs of the public versus the needs of the criminal defendant.
By ensuring that no jurors are struck for constitutionally
impermissible reasons, the Batson procedure allows the important
public interest in the selection of the criminal jury. The fact that both
the defendant and the potential juror are participants in the same
judicial process, with a common interest in eliminating discrimination
in the selection of jurors, is what satisfies the requirement for third
party standing that “the relationship between the litigant and the third
party may be such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a
proponent of the right as the latter.”267 Harm is done to the defendant,
263

Rose, supra note __, at 1067 (emphasis mine).

264

Rose, supra note __, at 1067.

265

Rose, supra note __, at 1067, 1094-98. Rose observes an interesting correlation
between negative views about jury selection and the critics of the peremptory:
The critics of the peremptory are essentially positing a “harm
hypothesis,” claiming that observing jury selection and the use of
peremptory damages the legitimacy of the court in the jurors’ eyes.
However, a contrasting possibility is that jury selection seeks out and
identifies those who have pre-existing negative views about the
courts or other case-related issues—what might be termed a “bad
attitude hypothesis.” If the peremptory challenge successfully
eliminates this group of people, it would not be surprising to learn
that they view the court in a negative light because this was precisely
the characteristic that contributed to their dismissal in the first place.

Id. at 1095 n. 121. Rose also notes that a few unpublished studies suggest that the
challenge experience has little impact upon jurors’ general satisfaction with the
system. Id.
266

Marder, supra note __, at 1050.

267

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976).

52

the individual juror and the community at large when a juror is
illegally stricken. The ethical imperative of Batson procedure ensures,
however, that this scenario is much less likely to happen.
In some ways, the “public perception” problem can be seen as
one of expressive state action.268 When a potential juror is stricken,
the action is formalized through the hands of the court. Whether the
peremptory challenge is at the hands of the prosecution or the defense,
the trial court is the mechanism for that strike. The state, by means of
the exercise of real and apparent judicial authority in excusing the
challenged juror, directly effects all acts, discriminatory or not,
through the trial court.269
As another scholar argues, however, “the appearance of
wrongdoing provides a reason to avoid action in situation in which the
actor stands in an important relationship with those who are likely to
mistake her actions.”270 As applied to the public perception concern,
this means that the fear of appearance of wrongdoing—the judge
inculcating bias by dismissing potential jurors presumably on the basis
of race or gender—provides a reason to avoid this action. A judge’s
willingness to raise a sua sponte Batson objection is thus heightened
by this aspect of expressive state action. “It provides a reason for the
actor to modify her behavior to accommodate the epistemic limitations
of those to whom she is responsible”271—that is, the public, or
potential jurors.
This all leads back to the normative framework of Batson. The
norms inculcated by Batson doctrine not only promote the aspiration
of non-discriminatory behavior, but also take into account the public
perception problem. Because Batson’s ethical imperative compels
responsible behavior by attorneys and jurists on behalf of not only the
defendant, but also the potential jurors, there is little conflict between
the two sets of rights. Batson ethics straddle the divide by compelling
lawyers and judges to consider both the defendant and the community
in acting in non-discriminatory ways.
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F. Why proposed substitutions for the peremptory challenge fail
A variety of substitutions have been suggested by critics of the
peremptory challenge. Although most center on some version of an
expanded for-cause challenge, others are more creative, proposing
peremptory challenges by blind questionnaire or even dispensing with
the requirement of unanimity for criminal trials. As I discuss below,
each of these putative solutions causes more trouble than the current
use of the peremptory challenge.
In addition, these approaches overreact to the existence of an
ethical imperative, creating procedures that are less likely to lead to
effective deliberation. Group polarization—where members of a
deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in
their spectrum—makes the deliberative process more difficult.272
Group polarization on juries is well documented.273 As a prominent
scholar notes, “[t]o the extent that the private judgments of individuals
are moved by discussion, the movement will be toward a more
extreme point in the direction set by the original distribution of
views.”274
Diversity of race and gender, which results from the nondiscrimination norms promulgated by Batson, helps eliminate
homogeneity.275 Eliminating homogeneity, via diversity, on juries
improves the deliberative process, because heterogeneous groups,
“building identification through focus on a common task rather than
through other social ties,”276 tend to produce the best outcomes.277
Thus a Batson regime with peremptory challenges recognizes that
diversity may promote deliberation while at the same time eliminating
from the jury individuals who may have extreme views, thus either
distorting the deliberative process or producing hung juries.
Finally, none of these reform proposals have an adequate
substitute for the peremptory challenge, properly limited to exclude
racial considerations, let alone possess any form of ethical framework
to guide lawyers. Accordingly, although they are interesting thought272
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exercises, these alternatives fail on both a practical and more
theoretical level.
1. The expanded for-cause challenge
Some in the Batson abolishment camp argue for an expanded
cause challenge to replace the peremptory challenge.278 The theory
here is that the for-cause challenge would be “enhanced to include any
sound, strategic, non-discriminatory reason why trial counsel might
doubt a juror’s impartiality or capacity to perform.”279
One critic proposes a revised for-cause challenge system,
which she argues would allow a mechanism for excusing nonimpartial jurors, but would be non-discriminatory since it would
eliminate peremptories.280 This scholar would revise the for-cause
challenge by making the standards for striking a potential juror for
cause somewhat easier, although still relatively narrow.281 This system
would improve upon the current peremptory system because the judge
would have to decide the merits of each and every challenge. 282
Another critic endorses the expanded for-cause challenge
because it is more consistent with the “rational decisionmaking” that
we prize in judicial proceedings.283 Although this critic does note that
it is possible that for-cause challenges might fail to reach all those who
should be removed from the jury, he contends that “the solution is to
refine the standards for these challenges, not to allow lawyers to make
standardless decisions.”284
The expanded for-cause challenge, however, would be a poor
substitute for the peremptory challenge as it currently exists. First,
increasing the number of for-cause challenges would lengthen the time
and expense of jury selection. Second, because the for-cause
challenge has such limited rules, counsel’s ability to shape the jury
would be severely curtailed.
Finally, and most importantly for this article, there would be
essentially no mechanism for addressing one side’s pattern of striking
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potential jurors for illegal bases. Simply because the strikes would
then be done through the for-cause challenge as opposed to the
peremptory challenge does not mean that trial counsel would not
attempt to control the shaping of the jury as much as possible; instead,
there would probably still be occasional instances of discriminatory
intent in for-cause challenges, either conscious or subconscious. With
the revised for-cause challenge system, however, there would be no
Batson procedure to eliminate these kinds of strikes.
2. Eliminating the requirement of unanimity in criminal
convictions
Some critics suggest the elimination of the unanimity
requirement in criminal juries as a replacement for the peremptory
challenge, moving away from an absolute unanimity requirement
toward a supermajority rule on juries.285 The elimination of the
peremptory challenge and replacement with non-unanimous juries was
done in England, is common in Europe286 and has been permitted by
the Supreme Court.287
Two reasons have been offered for why non-unanimity should
be considered. First, critics argue that most of the analogies between
juries and other institutions cut against unanimity, since majority or
supermajority rules are used by legislatures, appellate benches, voters
and grand juries.288 Second, and more importantly, critics posit that the
very idea of unanimity is outdated, as we have now eliminated
undemocratic barriers to jury service and permitted all adult citizens to
serve on juries.289 Therefore, “preserving unanimity might also be
undemocratic, for it would create an extreme minority veto of a kind
unknown to the Founders.”290
Though this idea of possibly eliminating unanimity is an
interesting one, ironically, it might result in the marginalization of
minority jurors, as there would be no procedure to ensure that they
would be properly represented on juries. Defense counsel would most
285
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likely oppose such elimination, because it would lower the bar
necessary to convict criminal defendants. Moreover, the requirement
of unanimity promotes serious deliberation – since everyone's vote is
291
Finally, and most simply,
necessary, everyone is equally counted.
the idea of a unanimous verdict in criminal trials is so enshrined as
part of the public perception of criminal justice that it is almost
impossible to imagine doing away with it.
More insidiously, however, eliminating the unanimity
requirement would exclude the impact of minorities on criminal jury
decisions. Based on our current demographics, minorities make up, at
most, maybe 10-15% of the criminal jury. Eliminating the unanimity
requirement would mean that the voices of minorities on the jury
would be systematically excluded. As has been argued in the context
of electoral districting, the dominant group would get all the power
and the votes of supporters of non-dominant groups or of disaffected
voters within the dominant group are wasted, and their votes would
lose significance.292
“A system is procedurally fair only to the extent that it gives each
participant an equal opportunity to influence outcomes.”293 A nonunanimous jury would fail to give each jury member an equal
opportunity to influence outcomes because invariably, a few members’
voices would go unheeded. Thus by eliminating the unanimity
requirement, only the majority group would achieve representation;
the non-dominant group, which would invariably include at least one
minority jury member, would have no voice. Essentially, a system of
representation that fails to provide group representation loses
legitimacy, whether it is electoral districting or criminal juries.294
Minorities on a non-unanimous jury would be consistently excluded
from decision-making power.
3. Retaining the form, if not the substance of the peremptory
challenge
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One novel approach that has been advanced for “fixing” the
peremptory challenge is to permit a form of peremptory challenges via
blind questionnaire.295 The argument here is that because lawyers will
not have viewed the jurors, the potential for race and gender bias
would be reduced. 296 Accordingly, the process would eliminate racial
and gender discrimination, it would enhance the probability of a more
impartial jury, and the need for the Batson procedure would be
eliminated.297
The problem with this admittedly creative idea, however, is that
bias and discrimination would not necessarily be eliminated by the use
of a blind questionnaire. Though lawyers would not be able to see the
jurors, they would be able to discern much from the questionnaires
themselves, and it is highly likely that discrimination would still stalk
the criminal jury selection process.
Ultimately, no substitution for the peremptory challenge will
eliminate the role of race, gender and ethnicity, and their attendant
issues, from criminal jury selection. Instead of attempting to eliminate
the realities of race and gender by fantasizing about abolishing the
Batson procedure and the peremptory challenge, it is more useful to
focus on the affirmative aspects of Batson and the normative
framework of legal ethics that it provides.
V. Conclusion: Implementing the Legal Ethics of Batson
Batson has many affirmative aspects. As we have seen, the
procedure positively affects both lawyers and the public by compelling
a normative framework of legal ethics which fosters nondiscrimination within jury selection and encourages the moral
aspirations of the bar.
Since its very inception, however, the Batson challenge has come
under a wide range of prudential attacks. As I explore above, Batson
has been blamed for everything from wasting time to instilling the
very bias it was meant to eradicate. As tempting as it may be to pin all
of contemporary concerns over the jury selection process on Batson,
though, this impulse should be resisted. Not only is Batson not
responsible for the plethora of evils articulated by its opponents, it also
provides a valuable normative framework of legal ethics, one that is
necessary in the arena of criminal justice, particularly in criminal jury
selection.
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Criminal jury selection is such a fraught enterprise, carefully
scrutinized by lawyer and layman alike, because it is the primary way
the public participates in the criminal justice system. With the advent
of open trials, legal reporters and even court television, public
participation in the criminal jury is a spectator sport, rife with scrutiny
and commentary.298 Moreover, the public’s participation in the
criminal jury is not only the primary way of participating in the polity,
but also establishes many of our notions of fairness and equality.
Therefore, the recent concerns and fears about who comprises the
criminal jury and how it functions should be seen as a reflection of the
ever-growing cultural awareness of the criminal justice system.
As more and more groups—African Americans, women,
minorities--have become enfranchised, they have demanded
participation in the justice system. The easiest and most enshrined
way to participate in the criminal justice system has traditionally been
serving on the petit jury. A free and open justice system is one of the
hallmarks of American democracy, and it is a formulation that informs
the modern American identity. As the composition of the criminal jury
went from all white to racially mixed, from all male to gender
diversity, from all Christian to religious multiplicity,
the
understanding of what comprised the modern criminal jury was deeply
complicated.
Additionally, the use of the peremptory as a tool to “stem the
inevitable tide of civil rights” before Batson has left a deep distrust in
institutional memory about whether the peremptory challenge can ever
be used to combat discrimination. Although African-Americans had
been legally permitted to vote and participate in the jury system since
Reconstruction, all-white juries were still common.299 Batson’s grand
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scheme to strip the peremptory challenge of its discriminatory past and
endow it as a tool to root out bias was inspired, but it has left lawyers
with a general uneasiness about both the efficacy and the fairness of
the tool.
Finally, as one scholar has observed, “deciding who sits on a
criminal jury is a deadly serious business.”300 The triad of defense
counsel, prosecutors and judges recognize that shaping a jury has
important, if not decisive, impact on trials, despite the strength of the
evidence.301 “It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the battle over
who sits on juries is a battle over the content of the criminal justice
dispensed in this country.”302
In essence, the peremptory challenge’s unfortunate history, our
greater cultural diversity, our desire to explore the inner workings of
the justice system, our concern over and very formulation of fairness,
the importance of criminal jury selection and our anxiety over race and
gender all get placed onto the peremptory. It is no wonder
abolishment seems like such a good option; it eliminates both the
discomfort, the racist and sexist history and—allegedly—the bias in
one fell swoop. Twenty years post-Batson, the law still struggles with
the intellectual after-effects of Batson and progeny. As much as we
are happy to pay lip service to anti- discrimination ideals, confronting
them within the criminal justice system has made the bar and bench
extremely uncomfortable.
The fact that Batson doctrine is so intimately intertwined with the
norms of non-discrimination, however, should put some of these fears
to rest. The structure of Batson requires the enforcement of these nondiscrimination norms during jury selection at each and every criminal
trial; whether a Batson challenge is raised or not, the lawyer’s
obligation to act professionally and responsibly is required for all
lawyers involved.
If one aspiration of legal ethics is, as I have noted before, for
lawyers to accept personal responsibility for the moral consequences
of their professional actions,303 then Batson helps achieve this goal. I
do not claim that the normative framework imposed by Batson
promises to solve all attorney behavioral problems within the criminal
trial; far from it. But Batson’s ethical imperative is a step in the right
direction. With enough steps like these, the twin ideals of the bar’s
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moral accountability, intertwined with the ideal of dispensing a true
criminal justice, may very well emerge.
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